In an area where until now national autonomy has been tenaciously resisted, new EU legislation provides Member States with 'flexibility to decide whether or not they wish to cultivate GMOs on their territory'. This forces attention on to the subtle, and not so subtle, ways in which internal market law constrains political actors in the EU. But it is similarly suggestive of how political actors might contribute to the evolution of the internal market. As well as exploring this relationship between the new legislation and internal market law, this article reflects on the ways in which lessons from the past have been addressed by legislators. Whilst it takes somewhat seriously the politics of GMOs, the new legislation simultaneously reinforces some of the limitations of our dominant models for generating knowledge, including the EU's problematic dichotomy between facts and values, risk assessment and risk management.
Introduction
The unfinished story of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the EU has been told many times, with many variations. And yet, there seems to be no end to the ways in which GMOs, and our responses to and understandings of them, expose features of legal and political phenomena that might otherwise go largely unremarked. The latest legislative chapter in the EU story is a 2015 Directive that claims 'to grant Member States, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, more flexibility to decide whether or not they wish to cultivate GMOs on their territory'.
1 This short (eight page, four article) piece of legislation deserves very careful attention. It is an important attempt at 'de-harmonisation', 2 the unpicking of harmonised legislation, and in an increasingly diverse and apparently * UCL. I am grateful to Chiara Armeni and Joanne Scott for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. it simultaneously reinforces some of the limitations of our dominant models for generating knowledge, perhaps in a more subtle reflection of internal market values.
This article begins in the next section by briefly outlining the difficulties encountered in the regulation of GMOs so far. The precise character of disagreement on GMOs is complicated, but includes questions about the existence and acceptability of the risks posed to human health and the environment; about the nature and acceptability of the distributive impacts of
GMOs; and about the existence and acceptability of other ethical questions, such as the extent to which GMOs interfere with and commodify 'nature'. 7 Both 'too much' politics, and 'too much' science are blamed for the intractability of the disagreement over GMOs, but the two categories cannot be separated, and mutually reinforce each other. 8 The 2015
legislation, and its permission to the Member States to restrict the cultivation of authorised GMOs in their territory, is then outlined, before turning to an exploration of the limits on Member State autonomy under the new legislation. Allowing more diverse national approaches to GMOs is in principle to be warmly welcomed. Nonetheless, the regulation of GMOs can only be understood in its broader legal context, and internal market rules will to a considerable extent determine what can and cannot be done with new found national freedom. GMOs have already demonstrated the limitations of legislative tweaks as a way to change engrained features of governance. But it is not implausible that the new legislation will shape the way internal market rules are applied: market rules are not natural phenomena that exist independently in the world. This article finally turns to consider the partial nature of the response of the new legislation to the dilemmas of risk regulation in the EU.
The path to the new legislation: Authorisation and contestation
The process for authorising GMOs broke down at the end of the 1990s, in the face of widespread public rejection of GM food and agriculture, and there were no authorisations between 1998 and 2004. The EU institutions and Member States ceased to apply the old legislation, and instead negotiated a new regulatory framework, composed of two key pieces The authorisation process is complicated, varying according to the level of (dis)agreement between the Member States, and according to the uses for which the GMO is to be authorised, in particular, according to whether the GMO (including a seed or other plant propagating material) is ultimately for food or feed use or not. The key steps are a risk assessment by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), on the basis of information submitted by the applicant, and a decision on authorisation by the Commission and Member
States through comitology (the examination procedure 13 This applies only to GMOs (including seeds) intended for food and feed. 14 Weimer, n 2 above. 15 Some reasons for that are found in administrative law and the grounds for authorisation in the legislation, see J. Scott, 'European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO' (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 213; Lee n 7 above, Chap 3. The Commission provides other reasons, n 12.
national measure in order to protect 'the environment or the working environment', provided it is based on 'new scientific evidence' and a problem 'specific to the member state', criteria interpreted narrowly. 16 The safeguard clauses in the legislation are even more limited, and harmonisation, whether the problem is so widespread that it demands a harmonised response, is crucial. 32 Given that the context of the new legislation is precisely the decision to allow national flexibility, we might expect a more generous interpretation, so that national and sub-national authorities are free to respond to their 'particular circumstances' in diverse ways, even if physical circumstances are widely shared.
The Commission's proposal for national flexibility in respect of GM food or feed not destined for cultivation 33 is a little simpler in its structure than the 2015 Directive, although there is plenty of opportunity for evolution during the legislative process. 34 The authorisation regime remains unchanged (so there is no opportunity to 'demand' a restricted geographical scope per se. By allowing national discretion, we clearly lose the opportunity to have a free trade in the market'. 36 On the narrow legal point, the new legislation is fairly clearly capable of being implemented compatibly with internal market disciplines, as discussed in the next section.
But the initial UK government response reveals a particular narrow understanding of the internal market, as well as the central place of that narrow internal market to, in turn, understandings of the proper role of the EU. This internal market prioritises the economic over the social and has limited tolerance for social regulation that limits 'freedom' to trade; 37 in turn, and possibly paradoxically in this case, that leads to limited tolerance for national or sub-national diversity. By contrast, other visions of the internal market will pay more attention to the social, and would be more welcoming of collective decisions about the world we live in, even if those collective decisions are taken in the historical national or local space. As
Weiler puts it, a choice of 'the market' is itself 'a highly politicized choice of ethos, ideology, and political culture'. 38 But, as he recognises, the choice does not end there: 'markets' are human constructions, of infinite variety. 39 The relationship between the economic and the social, and where authority should be exercised on those matters, has been the subject of long standing debates in the EU. 40 This is precisely one of the issues at stake in the contested governance of GMOs.
The concern for trade was not the only line of resistance to the proposal that eventually turned into the new legislation. The new legislation is presented as a way to increase authorisations, and hence increase the role of GMOs in EU agriculture. Those who sought to keep GMOs out of the EU may fear that the legislation will work precisely as planned, and when coupled with concern that the legislation grants only a very narrow space for national action in the internal market, the whole thing may look like a ruse. 41 As should become clear, I have some sympathy with this view. But in truth it is often a little simplistic to present decisions as belonging to either the national or the EU level. Authority is rarely monolithic. In the authorisation process, the Member States are obviously central to comitology, and they should also be involved in risk assessment, both in EFSA's constitution and in various levels of consultation. 42 The problem is that this sharing of authority has essentially broken down in the case of GMOs. Even if it does not provide straightforward autonomy for the national or sub-national level, the new legislation should still be taken seriously as representing a particular, shifting, vision of the internal market.
Trade, the internal market and national 'flexibility'
The governance of GMOs has been stymied by resistance to mutual recognition, 43 followed by resistance to harmonised decisions, and this is recognised by the new legislation. Internal market law, however, places significant constraints on a Member State wishing to restrict the cultivation of authorised GMOs under the new legislation. This is a self-conscious factor in the new legislation: the recitals provide that the measures must 'be in conformity with the Goods (including GMOs) are prima facie entitled to free movement in the internal market, and Article 34 TFEU is the basic provision prohibiting '[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect'. There is of course a daunting literature and case law on the internal market, on the doctrinal shifts and complexities, on its strengths and limitations, on its relationship with ideas of democracy, identity and constitution, and these tell their own stories about the ways in which the EU internal market is seen. For current purposes, it seems to be reasonably straightforward that a complete ban on the cultivation of GMOs (even in a small part of a Member State's territory) would fall within Article 34, 46 This section will discuss, first, the notion of 'compelling grounds' in the legislation, aligned with what counts as a good reason for national measures in internal market law. I will then turn to 'proportionality', under which rubric much of the policing of national measures is likely to take place. This discussion has two objectives. The first is to illustrate that the limits of GMO governance will be set by its interactions with internal market law; political and democratic choices have to fit into this space. 50 The second is to explore the ways in which internal market law may be shaped in turn by tenacious resistance to GMOs, as manifested 
Good reasons for national measures
The Member State will need to justify its measures in terms of public interest. The Directive lists some 'compelling grounds', as set out above: town and country planning; land use; socio-economic impacts; avoidance of GMO presence in other products (without prejudice to Article 26a); agricultural policy objectives; and public policy. As well as being fairly unspecific, the list is non-exhaustive, suggesting that we may turn to the Court's general case law on the objectives that a Member State may pursue compatibly with the internal market. The case law suggests that the Court would be reluctant to find that an objective genuinely believed by a government to be in the public interest is simply illegitimate.
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In an effort to present their measures in the terms that fit most readily into the pre-2015 legislative framework, governments have so far justified most national bans on cultivation on the basis of risk to environment and human health. The persistent and ongoing questioning of the adequacy of risk assessment of GMOs is certainly real, and is indeed acknowledged in the new legislation's promise to update the rules on risk assessment. 54 The place of 'risk'
in the new legislation is, however, tricky. In the original Commission proposal on Article 26b, human health and environmental protection were explicitly not permissible grounds for national measures. 55 Risks to the environment and human health were deemed to have been satisfactorily addressed by the authorisation procedure, and remained harmonised. In the final version of the legislation, health is not excluded, and environmental policy is The expectation seems to be that the new legislation will primarily be used to pursue objectives other than environmental and health protection. Quite how the Member States will explain these objectives, beyond the non-specific terms of the legislation, is not easy to 56 Although the Commission still refers to grounds 'other than those related to risks to health and the environment', n 12 above, 6-7. 57 predict. 64 Poland famously attempted to defend its ban on the cultivation of GM seeds as 'inspired by the Christian and Humanist ethical principles adhered to by the majority of the Polish people', 65 linking those principles to an objection to acquiring intellectual property rights in living organisms, to a 'quest for harmony between Man and Nature' and to an argument that the 'reduction of living organisms to the level of products for purely commercial ends' is likely 'to undermine the foundation of society'. 66 The Court did not comment on the legitimacy of those objectives, but it seems unlikely that they would be ruled out of bounds in principle, although they will be scrutinised carefully. 67 The Recitals to the Directive provide some assistance in filling out the compelling 'socioeconomic' grounds found in Article 26b. Recital 15 suggests that the 'high cost, impracticability or impossibility of implementing co-existence measures due to specific geographical conditions, such as small islands or mountain zones' 68 allows the Member
State to turn to the new Article 26b. Countries including Austria and Hungary are indeed concerned about the impossibility of co-existence, albeit more on the basis of the structure of their farming systems than the geographical conditions referred to in the recital. 69 Hungary is concerned that the small scale of farming in some of its regions will increase the costs of coexistence to the point that maintaining different forms of agriculture is economically unviable;
Austria that its high proportion of small farms and organic agriculture makes co-existence impossible. The recitals also provide that '[g]rounds relating to agricultural policy objectives may include the need to protect the diversity of agricultural production and the need to ensure seed and plant propagating material purity'. 70 Austria is concerned that widespread GM agriculture 'would at first interfere with and then, in the long-term, displace organic and conventional genetically modified-free production'. 71 In a different context, Austria has been allowed to pursue the 'social objectives' of 'preserving agricultural communities, maintaining a distribution of land ownership which allows the development of viable farms and sympathetic management of green spaces and the countryside'. 72 The distributive effects of
GMOs, who will reap the benefits and bear their costs, including concern that GMOs could be more compatible with large farms and monocultures than with smaller and mixed farming, seem to be implicit in some of this discussion. Hungary raises distribution more directly, claiming that the advantages are all with the 'giant' companies selling GMOs, and that agricultural biotechnology may 'totally [transform]' agriculture's 'social characteristics and traditions' affecting 'ownership structures, market relationships, … and biodiversity'.
The case law suggests that the Court is likely to be content to accept claims that a particular interest is a legitimate objective or 'compelling ground' for the (sub)-national authority to pursue (subject to proportionality and evidence, discussed below). It draws the line, however, at the pursuit of economic objectives, 73 even when it is argued that offering economic protection to a national industry allows that industry to provide other public, for example environmental, benefits. 74 Efforts to protect existing forms of farming or food production may in some cases have economic aspects. This could include for example protection from the costs of GM 'contamination', as above, but becomes particularly acute if the aim is to protect agriculture from economic competition from the large companies and farms which it is claimed will benefit most from agricultural biotechnology.
This bar on economic objectives, however, is neither completely without flexibility nor easy to predict. The most obvious area of flexibility is in the way the Court has applied internal market provisions to state services. Whilst this case law has been enormously controversial, 75 it is clear that efforts to protect state resources are a legitimate feature of, for example, measures aiming to protect public health or education systems. 76 The Court has also, perhaps more pertinently for current purposes, accepted the necessity of ensuring the profitability of domestic waste treatment centres 'where the objective of an economic nature necessarily enables the objective relating to health to be attained.' 77 The legislation refers explicitly to socio-economic objectives, which are not easily distinguishable from economic objectives. The link between a concern for the economic viability of particular ways of organising farming and underlying policy objectives is anticipated by Recital 14, which, as quoted above, raises the possibility that some agricultural practices can support 'ecosystem sustainability', the 'maintenance of local biodiversity', 'certain types of natural and landscape features', as well as 'specific ecosystem functions and services'.
Proportionality
The previous sub-section considered the sorts of objectives that might legitimately be pursued by a Member State under Article 26b. Although that will need to be carefully argued, much of the internal market policing of national measures will in fact take place under the rubric of 'proportionality'. The approach to proportionality in internal market cases is not straightforward, or consistent. 83 Proportionality 'proper', a substantive balancing of the importance of the objective being pursued against the degree of interference with the internal market, is unusual, 84 and reliance on listed 'compelling grounds' should help in that case to establish the importance of the objective pursued. The role of legislation in interpreting the Treaties is also however unclear, 89 and given the different approaches, any selection from the case law has to be read with caution. But the renewable energy cases make a useful example. In its not terribly searching examination of proportionality, the Court cites the legislation: 'it is essential, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the national support schemes, that Member States be able to "control the effect and costs of their national support schemes according to their different potentials"'.
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The existence of nationally differentiated targets for renewable energy was also significant, another shared recognition of diverse situations. 91 The picture is, of course, complicated, and there is surely no room for complacency. The new legislation claims that it is 'likely to improve the process for authorisations of GMOs'
and 'facilitate the smooth functioning of the internal market'. 93 It is not then simply about enhancing national autonomy on the grounds that diversity is thought to be preferable to uniformity; it is also to fix a failing system, when one of the reasons the failures matter so much is that they challenge the internal market core of the EU. 94 This raises questions of how deeply into the system the fix is prepared to go, and how much flexibility the legislation really provides in the context of the internal market.
The space left to the Member States by the new legislation is not easily predictable. It is certainly limited, but has the potential to be significant. Equally, the space for the legislation to shape the internal market is unpredictable, but again, could be significant. However things progress, the framing of the debate is revealing. The cultivation of GMOs is positioned as the European common interest, the norm, and their prohibition an anomaly that needs to be justified. 95 Although the 'compelling grounds' are not exhaustive, the question of whether any particular modification is needed, or provides a social benefit -essentially a justification for placing the product on the market -is notable for its absence from the new legislation. 96 Howse describes the 'myth of "trade and …"' as being 'that there is a trading system with a secure sense of self-identity facing "critics" who want to get in the door on the basis of some concern of dubious or complex relevance or relation to the system'. 97 The modesty of the legislation is clear: as much a reinforcement of access (of new technology) to the market, as a re-conceptualisation of the market.
Lessons learned and ignored: the political and technical in the new legislation
This new legislation responds to many years of criticism of both the narrow grounds for ambiguous in its structure. On the one hand, the legislation does indeed seem to recognise both broad grounds and national political authority. On the other hand, however, it may even reinforce the centrality and authority of a highly technocratic approach to decision-making at the EU level. In this section I try to explore the ambiguity of the legislation, first by thinking about the ways in which it may reinforce the contested approach to risk assessment at EU level, and secondly by speculating on the nature of the evidence that may be required from
Member States seeking to make use of the new legislation.
The acknowledgement in the new legislation of a broad range of possible reasons for decisions may be a partial response to alleged de-politicisation of EU decision-making.
Critiques of de-politicisation take many forms, at all levels of governance. 98 For current purposes, the concern is about a preference for universalising expert discourse, an assumption that everything that is interesting about GMOs can be captured by expert risk assessment, 99 reinforced by the way in which administrative and internal market law creates a narrow 'managerial space' 100 for risk regulation. The framing of the debate by this expert discourse can make it difficult for other perspectives to have a voice within the institutions of power; and the obscurity of the place where the 'real' decision is taken can make it difficult to identify a forum for democratic engagement, or indeed for any engagement with the normative questions. This de-politicisation matters because the choices being made in these technical spaces are in fact deeply political, 'choices by well placed men and women at various spots where power happens', 101 but are not open to contestation as such. Of course this is not to suggest that expertise and law 'successfully' sidesteps politics, so that politics disappears: not only would that be simplistic, but also paradoxical given the argument here about the potential of mutual influence between political actors and the internal market. principle, always been fully integrated into the process. 107 The institutionalisation has been weak however. Public views are difficult to feed into the process, the space for national ethical principles is uncertain, 'other legitimate factors' has never been applied, and in fact, EFSA and the Commission dominate the process.
So the new legislation is a fresh attempt to institutionalise the politics of GMOs, to embed politics in the regulatory process. But this is one side of the coin. We might equally be concerned that the new legislation will in fact reinforce the centrality of (EU) technical, expert authority. The legislation takes seriously the notion that there are concerns about GMOs that go beyond questions of risk, but does not engage with the equally significant, and equally well-recognised, difficulty of separating the political and the scientific (the risk and the other).
Values infuse risk assessment, and political decisions properly demand knowledge on facts about the world; neither is prior to or independent of the other. In practice this might mean for example that the level of risk or uncertainty one is prepared to tolerate is intimately connected with the distribution of benefit and burden; and that the normative commitments of individuals and institutions contribute to the choice of methodologies and comparators in the 102 Comitology at its best provides only a forum for closed deliberation rather than public politics, but the failure of comitology in the case of GMOs means that even in its own terms it cannot introduce normative criteria to the process. 103 States, we take a step backwards. 122 Which is not to say that enhanced room for diversity in this area is not a very good thing, or that this geographical and political space is inappropriate. GMOs raise fundamental questions about the sort of world we wish to live in, and these questions are likely to be understood differently in different cultures and contexts. 123 But it is crucial to continue to seek out space for normative assessment at both harm to human health and the environment.
I do not want to suggest that finding this space is straightforward. But the operation of the new legislation is still to be argued for, and could feasibly make a positive contribution.
Member States taking restrictive measures will need to collaborate with industry, other
Member States and the EU institutions, during and after the authorisation process. 124 The failure of collaboration and deliberation on GMOs so far is discouraging. But the fresh terms for discussion and the potential for divergent approaches could conceivably reinvigorate the debate at EU as well as national level; the utilisation by the Member States of the dichotomy between risk assessment and risk management, when they argue, as suggested above, that risks acceptable at the EU level are not acceptable nationally, could even destabilize that dichotomy.
There is a further element to the concern that the new legislation, far from expanding the space for political debate on GMOs, actually reinforces a technocratic approach. The new legislation may privilege a turn to methodologies that, whilst alternative to risk assessment, are equally prone to reductionism, and continue to exclude non-experts. Member States need to convince their interlocutors (courts, peers, industry and the EU institutions) of the case would make it more difficult to speak to some issues, and it may prefer the 'economic, concrete, quantifiable and direct' over the 'complex, indirect, qualitative and social'. 127 Further, gathering evidence could be costly, particularly since whilst the applicant for authorisation is required to provide data and information for the purposes of risk assessment, there is no such requirement in respect of other objectives.
Poland failed to justify its ban on the cultivation of GM seeds because it had 'failed … to establish that the true purpose of the contested national provisions was in fact to pursue the religious and ethical objectives'. 128 This may have been an extreme case. Poland raised its claimed religious and ethical motivations at the last moment, and did not seem to take very serious steps to convince the Court that these were indeed the reasons for its actions. In another GMO case, Advocate General Bot seemed sceptical that a restriction on cultivation could ever be 'necessary' to ensure co-existence, 129 and emphasised the need for 'strict proof that other measures would not be sufficient'. 130 If the new legislation is to open up decision-making on GMOs, demands for evidence should not be too rigid and diverse evidence should be acceptable. As well as economic and technical agronomic evidence, qualitative explanations of likely effects should be possible, evidence from the social sciences, evidence of public views on GMOs specifically, and on distributional issues more broadly, even the ways in which literature and art connect forms of agriculture with culture and identity. Questions of coherence or consistency may underpin questions of evidence, 132 such that a consistent approach towards, for example, the support of a particular farming structure (small, family farms), also goes to both the genuineness and the effectiveness of the Member State's motivations. Even in this respect, a counsel of perfection must be resisted, since the factors that affect whether or not to take action will vary in every case. 133 We might also call on the precautionary principle, as a general principle of EU law, 134 for example where there is inadequate or competing evidence on the impact of GMOs on small or organic farming: 'where there is scientific uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks', protective measures can be taken 'without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent'. 135 The Commission has hinted at the evidence that it will be looking for, and it does seem to point in a worrying direction for anyone concerned to open up decision-making. Its socioeconomic report on GMOs (which predates the new legislation, but not its proposal)
emphasised the importance of gathering 'statistically relevant data on socio-economic impacts', urging a move 'from polarised perceptions to more tangible and objective results'. 136 The Commission has established a 'European GMO Socio-Economics Bureau' to develop Reference Documents to 'enable a science-based assessment' of the socioeconomic implications of the cultivation and use of GMOs. 137 This sort of joint evidence gathering could be a useful resource for a Member State seeking to understand the vulnerability of its national farming structure. But an insistence on a particular sort of evidence could make certain types of justification difficult; and insistence on an 'EU' version of that evidence could significantly restrict diversity.
More encouragingly, although neither easy nor inexpensive, 138 the legislative language, to shape internal market disciplines in a reasonably flexible way.
The legislation deserves careful attention as representing a particular, shifting vision of the internal market. The change of philosophy in the new legislation is however partial. The tension is clear throughout the recitals, for example in the recognition that cultivation has 'strong national, regional and local dimensions, given its link to land use, to local agricultural structures and to the protection or maintenance of habitats, ecosystems and landscapes', but that simultaneously 'the common authorisation procedure, in particular the evaluation process conducted primarily by [EFSA] should not be adversely affected'. 143 Whilst the new legislation takes somewhat seriously the politics of GMOs, it fails to take seriously the limitations of dominant EU models for generating knowledge.
